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Co-ordination in software agent systems
H S Nwana, L Lee and N R Jennings 
The objective of this paper is to examine the crucial area of co-ordination in multi-agent systems. It does not attempt to
provide a comprehensive overview of the co-ordination literature; rather, it highlights the necessity for co-ordination in
agent systems and overviews briefly various co-ordination techniques. It critiques these techniques and presents some
conclusions and challenges drawn from this literature.
1.  Introduction
The scope of this paper is limited mainly to software
multi-agent systems (MAS). The breakdown of the paper is
as follows. Section 2 argues more cogently why co-
ordination is vital, not only in DAI and agent-based
systems, but also to open distributed systems. Section 3
overviews briefly various co-ordination techniques.
Negotiation, overviewed in section 4, is one of the
techniques used to achieve co-ordination in agent-based
systems. It is overviewed separately because it has an
extensive literature in its own right. Section 5 presents some
lessons learned and some heuristics on co-ordination, and
section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The necessity for co-ordination
· Preventing anarchy or chaos — co-ordination is
necessary or desirable because, with the
decentralisation in agent-based systems, anarchy can
set in easily. No longer does any agent possess a global
view of the entire agency to which it belongs. This is
simply not feasible in any community of reasonable
complexity. The chairman of BT, for example, cannot
possibly be aware of the detailed activities of all his
130 000 employees. Consequently, agents only have
local views, goals and knowledge which may conflict
with others. They can enter into all sorts of
arrangements with other agents or agencies. Like in
any society, such haphazard arrangements are prone to
anarchy; to achieve common goals, which is a raison
d’être for having multiple agents in the first place, a
group of agents need to be co-ordinated. 
· Meeting global constraints — there usually exist global
constraints which a group of agents must satisfy if they
are to be deemed successful. For example, a system of
Co-ordination is a central issue in software agent sys-tems in particular, and in distributed artificial intelli-
gence (DAI) in general. However, it has also been studied
by researchers in diverse disciplines in the social sciences,
including organisation theory, political science, social psy-
chology, anthropology, law and sociology. For example,
organisation theorists have investigated the co-ordination of
systems of human beings, from small groups to large formal
organisations [1, 2]. Economists have studied co-ordination
in markets of separate profit-maximising firms [3]. Even
biological systems appear to be co-ordinated though indi-
vidual cells or ‘agents’ act independently and in a seem-
ingly non-purposeful fashion. Human brains exhibit co-
ordinated behaviour from apparently ‘random’ behaviours
of very simple neurones. Essentially, co-ordination is a
process in which agents engage in order to ensure a commu-
nity of individual agents acts in a coherent manner.
What is co-ordination? Why is it necessary or desir-able? Co-ordination has already been defined, in sec-
tion 1, as a process in which agents engage in order to
ensure their community acts in a coherent manner. Coher-
ence means that the agents’ actions gel well, and that they
do not conflict with one another. In other words, coherence
refers to how well a system of agents behaves as a unit [4].
There are several reasons why multiple agents need to be
co-ordinated [5, 6].
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agents constructing a design may have to work within
the constraints of a pre-specified budget. Similarly,
agents doing network management may have to
respond to certain failures within seconds and others
within hours. Agents need to co-ordinate their
behaviour if they are to meet such global constraints. 
· Distributed expertise, resources or information —
agents may have different capabilities and specialised
knowledge in a similar manner to paediatricians,
neurologists and cardiologists. Alternatively, they may
have different sources of information, resources (e.g.
processing power, memory), reliability levels,
responsibilities, limitations, charges for services, etc.
In such scenarios, agents have to be co-ordinated in
just the same way that different medical specialists
including anaesthetists, surgeons, ambulance
personnel, nurses, etc, work together to treat someone
who has been in a near-fatal accident. In this example,
none of these experts working in isolation possesses all
the necessary expertise, information, or the casualty
and medical resources (e.g. equipment). 
· Dependencies between agents’ actions — agents’ goals
are frequently interdependent. Consider two agents
solving the trivial blocks world problem shown in
Fig 1. 
 Fig 1 A blocks world problem.
The easiest way to solve it would be for the first agent
to take on the sub-goal of stacking B on C while the
second stacks A on top of the stack B-C in order to
achieve A-B-C. Clearly, the sub-goals are
interdependent; the second agent has to wait for the
first agent to complete its sub-goal before it can
perform its own. Where such interdependencies exist,
and they invariably do in MAS, the activities of the
agents must be co-ordinated . 
· Efficiency — even when individuals can function
independently, thereby obviating the need for co-
ordination, information discovered by one agent can be
of sufficient use to another agent that both agents can
solve the problem twice as fast.
Co-ordination, in turn, may require co-operation; but it
is important to emphasise that co-operation among a set of
agents would not necessarily result in co-ordination; indeed,
it may result in incoherent behaviour. This is because for
agents to co-operate successfully, typically, they must
maintain models of each other as well as develop and
maintain models of future interactions. If agents’ beliefs
about each other are wrong, for example, incoherent
behaviour may well result. Co-ordination may occur
without co-operation. For example, if a person is running
towards you, and you get out of his way, you have co-
ordinated your actions with his. However, you have not
entered into co-operation with him. Likewise, non-co-
operation among agents does not necessarily lead to
incoherent behaviour (it may just happen to end up co-
ordinated); however, it is likely to do so. Competition is a
form of co-ordination involving antagonistic agents. To
achieve co-ordination, agents may have to communicate
with one another. However, as Huhns and Singh [7] point
out, agents may achieve co-ordination without
communication, provided they possess models of each
others’ behaviours. In such a situation, co-ordination can be
achieved mainly via organisation. However, to facilitate co-
ordination, where agents have to co-operate through
communication, it is vital that they make known their goals,
intentions, results and state to other agents. The literature on
co-ordination abounds because it is used to address several
DAI and distributed computing issues, including:
· network coherence — maximising how well a
distributed system of agents work together,
· task and resource allocation among agents,
· recognising and resolving disparities or conflicts in
goals, facts, beliefs, viewpoints and behaviour of
agents,
· determining the organisational structure (i.e.
architecture) of an agent set-up, i.e. defining the roles,
responsibilities and chains of authority between agents.
The above list is not exhaustive. The outcome of a co-
ordination process is, hopefully, a coherent set-up of agents
— a set-up in which deadlock and livelock are avoided.
Deadlock refers to a state of affairs in which further action
between two or more agents is impossible; on the contrary,
livelock refers to a scenario where agents continuously act
(e.g. exchange tasks), but no progress is made. A co-
ordinated set-up also maximally exploits the capabilities of
individual agents and minimises conflicts and resource
contentions between them. A coherent system will minimise
or avoid conflicting and redundant efforts among agents.
Clearly then, co-ordination is a necessary and desirable
property of agent systems.
Co-ordination is not only a concern to agent researchers.
With emerging technologies such as open systems, client-
server computing, the World Wide Web (WWW) and the
Internet, there is an unmistakable trend towards distributed
computing systems, and this trend is set to continue well
into the next millennium. The autonomous components or
start
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parts of such open distributed systems, which are analogous
to agents in agent-based systems, need to be co-ordinated. 
3. An overview of co-ordination techniques
· organisational structuring,
· contracting,
· multi-agent planning,
· negotiation.
There follows an overview and brief critique of each
category separately.
3.1 Organisational structuring
This is the simplest co-ordination scenario which
exploits the a priori organisational structure. This is
because the organisation defines implicitly the agent’s
responsibilities, capabilities, connectivity and control flow.
It provides a framework for activity and interaction through
the definition of roles, communication paths and authority
relationships. Durfee et al define this as the pre-defined
long-term relationships between agents [8]. Hierarchical
organisations abound, yielding the classic master/slave or
client/server co-ordination technique, used typically for task
and resource allocation among slave agents by some master
agent. This technique is implemented in a couple of ways.
· The master agent plans and distributes fragments of the
plan to the slaves. The slaves may or may not
communicate among themselves, but must ultimately
report their results to the master agent.
In this case, while the master has full autonomy with
respect to the slaves, the slaves have only partial
autonomy with respect to their master. 
· Blackboard negotiation exploits the classic blackboard
architecture [9] to provide a co-ordinating base. In this
scheme the blackboard’s knowledge sources are
replaced by agents who post to and read from the
general blackboard. The scheduling agent (or master
agent) schedules the agents’ reads/writes to/from the
blackboard. This scheme is employed by Werkman in
his DFI system [10]. This approach may be used when
the problem is distributed, a central scheduling agent is
present or when tasks have already been assigned, a
priori, to agents. Sharp Multi-Agent Kernel (SMAK)
also adopts a blackboard strategy [11].
The latter point highlights the fact that organisational
work ought not to be solely associated with hierarchies. For
example, in the DVMT system [12] which also exploits a
blackboard, co-ordination occurs among peer agents.
Other organisational structures exist, of course,
including the centralised and decentralised market
structures. The centralised market structure employs a
master/slave co-ordination approach while a contracting
technique, described in the next section, is more suitable for
a decentralised market structure.
Critique
These strategies are useful where there are master/slave
relationships in the MAS being modelled. Much control is
exerted over the slaves’ actions, and hence the problem-
solving process. However, such control, in its extremes,
mitigate against all the benefits of DAI — speed (due to
parallelism) reliability, concurrency, robustness, graceful
degradation, minimal bottlenecks, etc. In the blackboard co-
ordination scheme, with no direct agent-to-agent
communication, a severe bottle-neck may result if there are
many agents, even in the case of multi-partitioned
blackboards. Furthermore, all agents would need to have a
common domain understanding (i.e. semantics). For this
latter reason, most blackboard systems tend to have
homogeneous and rather small-grained agents as is the case
in the DVMT prototype [12]. Durfee et al [13] point out that
such centralised control as in the master/slave technique is
contrary to the basic assumptions of DAI. It presumes that
at least one agent has a global view of the entire agency —
in many domains, this is an unrealistic assumption. Even
when a master/slave co-ordination technique is used, the
designer should ensure that the slaves are of sufficient
granularity to compensate for the overheads which result
from goal distribution. Distributing trivial or small tasks can
be more expensive than performing them in one location
[8].
3.2 Contracting
A, now classic, co-ordination technique for task and
resource allocation among agents and determining
organisational structure is the contract net protocol [14, 15].
In this approach, which assumes a decentralised market
structure, agents can assume two roles:
· a manager who breaks a problem into sub-problems
and searches for contractors to do them, as well as to
monitor the problem’s overall solution,
· a contractor who does a sub-task — however,
contractors may recursively become managers and
further decompose the sub-task and sub-contract them
to other agents.
T here are many approaches which have been devised toachieve co-ordination in agent systems. Co-ordination
techniques are classified here in the following four broad
categories: 
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Managers locate contractors via a process of bidding
which proceeds as follows:
· a manager announces a task,
· contractors evaluate the task with respect to their
abilities and commitments,
· contractors table bids to the manager,
· the manager evaluates received bids, chooses a
contractor and awards the contract to it,
· the manager waits for the result of the contract.
This is a completely distributed scheme where a node
can both simultaneously be manager and contractor. This
approach has been used in many applications, e.g. Parunak
[16]. It has also been further generalised in other projects
like the multistage negotiation in Conry et al [17].
Critique
Huhns and Singh [7] note that the contract net is a high-
level co-ordination strategy which also provides a way of
distributing tasks, and a means for self-organising a group
of agents. It is best used when: 
· the application task has a well-defined hierarchical
nature,
· the problem has a coarse-grained decomposition,
· there is minimal coupling among sub-tasks.
The advantages of the contract net include the following
— dynamic task allocation via self-bidding which leads to
better agreements, agents can be introduced and removed
dynamically, it provides natural load-balancing (as busy
agents need not bid), and it is a reliable mechanism for
distributed control and failure recovery [7].
Its limitations include the fact that it does not presume
agents with contradictory demands; hence, the approach
neither detects nor resolves conflicts, which is one key
reason why co-ordination is needed in the first place. The
agents in the contract net are rather passive, benevolent and
non-antagonistic which for many real-world problems is
unrealistic. Conry et al’s generalisation of the contract net
approach [17] essentially introduces an iterative mechanism
for getting agents with conflicting goals to arrive at a
consensus. Lastly, the contract net approach is rather
communication-intensive, the costs of which may outweigh
some of its advantages in real-world applications.
3.3 Multi-agent planning
Another approach to co-ordination in agent-based
systems is to engage the agents in multi-agent planning. In
order to avoid inconsistent or conflicting actions and
interactions, agents build a multi-agent plan that details all
the future actions and interactions required to achieve their
goals, and interleave execution with more planning and re-
planning. There are two types of multi-agent planning:
· centralised multi-agent planning,
· distributed multi-agent planning.
In centralised multi-agent planning, there is usually a
co-ordinating agent who, on receipt of all partial or local
plans from individual agents, analyses them in order to
identify potential inconsistencies and conflicting
interactions (e.g. conflict between agents over limited
resources). The co-ordinating agent then attempts to modify
these partial plans and combines them into a multi-agent
plan where conflicting interactions are eliminated. Georgeff
[18, 19] exemplifies such an approach where conflicting
interactions are identified and grouped into critical regions.
In the final multi-agent plan, communication commands are
inserted to synchronise agents’ interactions appropriately.
Cammarata et al [20] also employ centralised multi-agent
planning in a simulated air-traffic control domain. In this
demonstrator, agents (i.e. aeroplanes) in a potential conflict
scenario, e.g. two aeroplanes are heading for collision,
decide on one of their number to act as co-ordinating agent
to whom the plans of the other agent are sent. This co-
ordinating agent will then attempt to modify its own flight
plan in order to resolve the conflict. Jin and Koyama [21]
propose their MATPEN model for co-ordinating
autonomous and distributed agents based on centralised
planning. Their approach exploits an ‘expectation-based
negotiation protocol’ which draws from the roles of agents
in the organisational structure. When two agents share a
conflict, they form a conflict group and initiate a negotiation
process. The exchange ‘expectations’ (which represent the
expected behaviour of other agents in order to resolve the
conflict) in order to decide who should play what role in the
negotiation process. Eventually, they generate a multi-agent
plan to resolve the conflict. They have constructed a
collision avoidance system for ships using MATPEN. 
In distributed multi-agent planning, the idea is to
provide each agent with a model of other agents’ plans [22].
Agents communicate in order to build and update their
individual plans and their models of others’ until all
conflicts are removed. An exemplification of this approach
is Lesser and Corkill’s functionally accurate and co-
operative (FA/C) protocol [23]. In this approach, loosely-
coupled agents form high-level (but possibly incomplete)
plans, results and hypotheses which they exchange with
each other. Next, they refine these until they all converge on
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some global complete plan. Local inconsistencies are
detected and only the part of each agents’ results that are
consistent with local information are integrated into the
local databases. This approach has been used in Lesser and
Corkill’s Distributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed (DVMT)
— a system for testing co-ordination strategies [12].
Another exemplification of distributed multi-agent planning
is Durfee’s partial global planning (PGP) approach [24]. In
this technique, agents execute their local plans with each
other, which, in turn, are modified continuously based on
partial global plans (built by exchanging local plans).
Therefore, agents are always looking out for potential
improvements to group co-ordination.
Critique
Generally, multi-agent planning of whatever form
requires that agents share and process substantial amounts
of information; hence, it is likely to require more computing
and communication resources than other approaches. The
centralised multi-agent planning technique shares many of
the limitations of the master/slave co-ordination technique.
Naturally, the co-ordination in distributed multi-agent
planning is much more complex than in the centralised form
as there may not be any agent who possesses a global view
of the distributed system. Furthermore, since co-ordination
in some existing multi-agent planning techniques, such as
PGP, is a gradual process, the scopes of their applicability
may be better for some domains than others [7].
4. Negotiation
“...negotiation is the communication process of a group
of agents in order to reach a mutually accepted
agreement on some matter.”
Sycara further points out that to negotiate effectively,
agents must reason about beliefs, desires and intentions of
other agents [4], and this has led to the development of
techniques for the following:
· representing and maintaining belief models,
· reasoning about the other agents’ beliefs,
· influencing other agents’ intentions and beliefs.
These latter topics lead to the usage of all sorts of
artificial intelligence (AI) and mathematical techniques
including logic, case-based reasoning (CBR), belief
revisions, distributed truth maintenance, multi-agent
planning, model-based reasoning (MBR), optimisation and
game theory. Furthermore, there is literature which
proposes and reports on multi-agent test-beds, languages,
protocols and interlinguas. In addition, there are also the
purely social, cognitive and sociologically based papers.
Thus, it is not difficult to explain the huge and varied
literature on this subject of negotiation.
It is also conceded that the distinction made between
negotiation and the other co-ordination approaches
discussed in section 3 is quite fuzzy. Indeed, another paper,
which overviews negotiation strategies [5], covers many of
the aforementioned co-ordination techniques. This
overview is not meant to be so exhaustive as to provide a
road map through the more important literature on
negotiation. Negotiation techniques are classified in the
following three broad categories: 
· game theory-based negotiation,
· plan-based negotiation,
· human-inspired and miscellaneous AI-based nego-
tiation approaches.
4.1 Game theory-based negotiation
There is now a growing body of work on negotiation
which is based on game theory [26]; perhaps the origins of
such work can be traced back to Rosenschein’s doctoral
thesis [27]. With the help of one of his former students,
Rosenschein has since refined, synthesised and collated his
earlier work in one volume [28]. Using the tools of game
theory, this book outlines an approach which shows how to
achieve co-ordination among a set of rational and
autonomous agents without an explicit co-ordination
mechanism built into these agents a priori. In other words,
it does not presume the ‘benevolent agent assumption’.
The key concepts in this game theory approach to
negotiation are the following — utility functions, a space of
deals, strategies and negotiation protocols. Utility is defined
as the difference between the worth of achieving a goal and
the price paid in achieving it. A deal is an action an agent
can take which has an attached utility. The negotiation
protocol defines the rules which govern the negotiation,
including how and when it ends (e.g. by agreement or no
deal). In the book [28], several protocols and strategies for
negotiation are outlined.
The actual negotiation proceeds as follows. Utility
values for each outcome of some interaction for each agent
are built into a pay-off matrix, which is common knowledge
A significant part of the co-ordination work which hasbeen done or is being done world-wide goes under the
heading ‘negotiation’. This is because most co-ordination
schemes involve some sort of negotiation. For this reason, it
has merited a section on its own in this paper. The literature
abounds because negotiation is a key co-ordination tech-
nique used to address several DAI issues such as those
listed in section 2. However, there are probably as many
similar definitions of negotiation as there are negotiation
researchers. Perhaps, a more succinct and basic one is that
of Bussman and Muller [25]: 
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to both (typically) parties involved in the negotiation. The
negotiation process involves an interactive process of offers
and counter-offers in which each agent chooses a deal
which maximises its expected utility value. There is an
implicit assumption that each agent in the negotiation is an
expected utility maximiser. At each step in the negotiation,
an agent evaluates the other’s offer in terms of its own
negotiation strategy.
Zlotkin and Rosenschein [29] have also extended work
to cover agents that are not truthful, i.e. they can be
deceptive; interestingly, using some simple demonstrators,
they show that if an agent withholds certain information or
deliberately misinforms other agents, this may result in
better negotiation deals for the agent. In this work they view
negotiation as a two-stage process — the actual negotiating
and the execution of the joint plans. In their recent work,
they are working on a general theory of automated
negotiation in which they classify complex domains into
three — task-oriented domains, state-oriented domains and
worth-oriented domains [28].
Kraus and Wilkenfield also examine negotiation using
game-theory techniques with appropriate modification [30].
In this paper, they propose a strategic model that claims to
take time into consideration during the negotiation process.
Time influences the outcome of the negotiations and avoids
delays in reaching agreements. 
Critique
Game theory-based negotiation fails to address some
crucial issues [31]. Firstly, agents are presumed to be fully
rational and acting as utility maximisers using predefined
strategies. Secondly, all agents have knowledge of the pay-
off matrix, and therefore full knowledge of the other agent’s
preferences — this is certainly unlike the real world where
agents only have partial or incomplete knowledge of their
own domains, let alone those of others. Therefore, this is
unrealistic for truly non-benevolent and loosely-coupled
agencies. Furthermore, the pay-off matrix could become
very large and intractable for a negotiation involving many
agents and outcomes. Thirdly, agents only consider the
current state when deciding on their deal — past
interactions and future implications are simply ignored.
Fourthly, agents are considered to have identical internal
models and capabilities. Fifthly, much of the work
presumes two agents negotiating, though some later work is
addressing n-agent negotiation [32]. Sixthly, and
consequently, despite Zlotkin and Rosenschien’s provision
of mathematical proof of their ideas [32], it is unlikely that
game theory-based negotiation will suffice for real-life,
industrial agent-based applications for the reasons already
offered. In brief, its assumptions are untenable in real
applications.
4.2 Plan-based negotiation
Alder et al [33] investigate negotiated agreements and
discuss methods of conflict detection and resolution in the
domain of telephone network traffic control. They imbue
their agents with planning knowledge as they strongly
maintain that negotiation and planning are very tightly
intertwined due to the fact that agents need information
from others to function effectively and efficiently.
Kreifelt and von Martial propose a negotiation strategy
for autonomous agents [34]; they view negotiation as a two-
stage process — firstly, agents plan their activities
separately, and then, secondly, they co-ordinate their plans.
The co-ordination of all the agents’ plans is done by a
separate co-ordination agent, though they note that this role
may be played by any of the agents. They then proceed to
present a negotiation protocol in terms of agents’ states,
message types and conversation rules between agents. This
proposal also has many limitations. As Bussman and Muller
[25] rightly point out, it does not really present a negotiation
model but just prescribes one, and it is really left to the
agents how they really achieve consensus. The protocol
itself also needs some further clarification. In general, plan-
based negotiation suffers from the limitations of centralised
or distributed multi-agent planning (see section 3.3),
depending on which of these two types is used.
4.3 Human-inspired and miscellaneous AI-based 
negotiation approaches
It appears that almost every form of human interaction
requires some degree of explicit or implicit negotiation [10].
Hence, it is not very surprising that many negotiation
researchers draw from human negotiation strategies. As
noted earlier, these often lead to the usage of miscellaneous
AI techniques including logic, CBR, constraint-directed
search, etc, as is evidenced by the following. However,
some of the examples below just provide AI-based
negotiation approaches which do not necessarily borrow
from human interactions.
Sycara’s work [4], which sees negotiation as an iterative
activity, proposes a general negotiation model that attempts
to handle multi-agent, multiple-issue, single and repeated
type negotiations. Her view of negotiation leads her to
exploit CBR and multi-attribute utility theory. She argues
for a case-based approach based on her belief that human
negotiators draw from the past negotiation experiences to
guide present and future ones. In the absence of past cases,
she resorts to preference analysis based on multi-attribute
theory. In the latter case, issues involved in negotiation are
represented by utility curves. By combining these curves in
additive and multiplicative fashions, a proposal is chosen
which maximises the utility. Sycara has constructed a
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system called PERSUADER that resolves adversarial
conflicts in labour relations with the aid of two practising
negotiators. Agents can modify others’ beliefs, behaviours
and intentions via persuasion. Sycara strongly believes that
the latter is a necessity in order to create co-operative
interactions.
Sathi and Fox [35] argue that negotiation may be
viewed as a constraint-directed search of a problem space
using negotiation operators. They see negotiation as
composed of two phases — a communications phase, where
all information is communicated to participating agents, and
a bargaining phase, where deals are made between
individuals or in a group. In their approach, agents negotiate
via relaxing various conflicts and constraints until
agreement is reached. Alternatively, the solutions may be
modified. Initially, preferences of negotiation are modelled
as constraints. The negotiation operators are drawn from
human negotiation studies [36] and include operators which
simulate relaxation, reconfiguration and composition, which
are used to generate new constraints. This approach has
been used to build a system for resource allocation which
‘performs marginally better than experts’.
The main limitation of this iterative approach stems
from the fact that selecting relaxations to achieve a
compromise is a major problem as no criteria are provided,
and hence agents easily get caught in an infinite loop of
exchanging offers (i.e. livelock).
Werkman proposes a knowledge-based model of an
incremental form of negotiation [10]. Werkman’s Designer
Fabricator Interpreter (DFI) model, it is claimed, is based
largely on various human models of negotiation. This
scheme uses a shared-knowledge representation, called
shareable agent perspectives, which: 
“...allows agents to perform negotiation in a manner
similar to co-operating (or competing) experts who
share a common background of domain knowledge.”
Essentially, it exploits a blackboard with partitions for
requested proposals, rejected proposals, accepted proposals,
a communications partition and shared knowledge. Such
rich detail and knowledge of the perspectives of other
agents provide invaluable information for agents to make
better proposals in the future.
Werkman [10] sees negotiation as a three-phase cycle.
The first phase involves some proposing agent announcing
a proposal which is received and evaluated by the receiving
agent. The second phase involves generating a counter
proposal if the latter is not happy with the initial proposal,
or it may be simply accepted. Phase three involves the
submission of the counter proposal for review by other
agents. An arbitrator agent assists when two agents get into
deadlock by reviewing the negotiation dialogue and uses
their mutual information network to generate alternative
proposals. This is done using issue relaxation techniques or
some intelligent proposal generator. This may fail, in which
case the arbitrator may set time limits or use other
techniques.
This proposal is interesting and definitely worth
studying in greater detail. The use of arbitration is relatively
novel. His agents communicate via the blackboard through
a speech-act based language. The centralised blackboard
could be a bottle-neck, and, without an explicit scheduler,
reading and posting to the blackboard seems chaotic.
However, this proposal does seem to have a good
understanding of the negotiating process. It has also been
implemented in the DFI system.
Conry et al [37] specifically concerned themselves with
negotiation strategies for distributed constraint satisfaction
problems where a network of agents have a goal, but each
node or agent has only limited resources. The local
constraints give rise to a complex set of global and inter-
dependent constraints. This investigation was done in the
context of the long-haul transmission and more complex
communication networks which they were researching.
Their implementation involved developing algorithms for
multi-agent planning while taking the inevitable conflicts
into consideration. This piece of work is interesting because
it begins the investigation of whether specific generic tasks
may be linked with specific negotiation strategies.
Researchers on negotiation will need to identify such links
if the literature is to be made less ad hoc.
Bussmann and Muller’s negotiating framework for co-
operating agents [25] is, arguably, one of the most useful
papers on negotiation in the literature. Drawing from socio-
psychological theories of negotiation, particularly
Gulliver’s eight phases of the negotiation process [38], they
evolve a cyclic negotiation model which is both general and
simple. They attempt to address many of the limitations of
other negotiation proposals/models. The cyclic nature of the
model addresses the thorny issue of conflict resolution.
The general strategy is that negotiation begins with one,
some or every agent making a proposal. Then agents
evaluate and check the proposals against their preferences,
and criticise them by listing their preferences which are
violated by the proposals. The agents then update their
knowledge about other agents’ preferences and the
negotiation cycle resumes with a new proposal or proposals
in the light of the newly gleaned information. Conflicts
between agents are handled in a concurrent conflict
resolution cycle.
Bussmann and Muller’s suggestion is untested but it
does seem to draw from and address the limitations of many
others. In this respect, it is an interesting proposal.
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Finally, other researchers have proposed negotiation
protocols including Kuwabara and Lesser’s extended
protocol for multistage negotiation [39] and Durfee and
Montgomery’s hierarchical protocol for co-ordinating
multi-agent behaviour [40]. Naturally, protocols of this
nature implicitly implement some negotiation strategy (e.g.
Kuwabara and Lesser’s implements the multistage
negotiation strategy of Lesser’s group at the University of
Massachusetts), and, if it is suitable for some particular task,
then it may as well be reused.
5. Lessons learned and some heuristics on co-
ordination/negotiation
· One-off co-ordination strategies (or combination of
strategies) are devised and used in one-off projects.
Hence, solid conclusions as to their scope,
applicability, usability, etc, have not been established.
· There is little empirical or theoretical support for any
strategy or strategies. Not enough studies have been
done to validate many of the proposals.
· It is not very clear when, where, how and why various
negotiation and co-ordination strategies or
combinations of them are used in various applications
or proposals.
· The contract net and the master/slave models and
variations of them appear to be the most used strategies
due to their simplicity. Various AI, mathematical and
operational research techniques are being used to
realise co-ordination. This paper has highlighted some,
e.g. including viewing negotiation as constraint-
directed search [35]. Most of them seem to be either
problem-dependent or were just used because the
researchers had experience using those techniques;
hence, their choice seem rather ad hoc. However, the
problem-dependent issues cannot be ignored as they
are crucial to the success of individual applications.
· Various techniques make fundamental assumptions
about agents which must be understood. For example,
the contract net approach presumes truly benevolent,
trustful, non-conflicting and helpful agents.
· Most co-ordination or negotiation strategies do not
involve any complex meta-reasoning required of most
domains. For example, few take into consideration the
time aspects, and the fact that agents’ goals, beliefs,
intentions, etc, change with time. Hence, in real life,
something an agent is currently doing may no longer
matter because, say, the deadline is past, in which case
it is best that it stops or forgets about that particular
task/sub-task. Alternatively, the resources may not be
available at the times required by the agents. These
introduce non-trivial dimensions to co-ordination.
· There is a lack of fundamental analysis of the process
of co-ordination and negotiation. Jennings [6] is a step
in this direction.
6. Conclusions
Based on our experiences and observations, it is
possible to identify four major components which must be
present in any comprehensive co-ordination technique [6].
Firstly, there must be structures which enable the agents to
interact in predictable ways. Secondly, there must be
flexibility so that agents can operate in dynamic
environments and can cope with their inherently partial and
imprecise viewpoint of the community. Thirdly, there must
be social structures which describe how agents should
behave towards one another when engaged in the co-
ordination process. Finally, the agents must have sufficient
knowledge and reasoning capabilities to exploit both the
available structure (individual and social) and the
flexibility.
For the future, further theoretical work is needed to
develop adequate, and appropriately broad, models of co-
ordination which address all of the four major components
identified above. This should then lead to better specified
implementations of co-ordination algorithms which have
clearly delimited ranges of applicability. This approach will
also enable more systematic evaluation of the different
algorithms to be undertaken so that system builders can
base their design decisions on empirical evidence (rather
than on their ad hoc preconceptions). 
T his section synthesises some of the key lessons culledfrom this review of the co-ordination literature, and
presents some conclusions which have been drawn from the
literature on co-ordination.
T his paper has overviewed the diverse literature on co-ordination in agent-based systems. Successful co-ordi-
nation is a key design objective for most multi-agent system
builders. Without good co-ordination mechanisms, many of
the benefits of the multi-agent paradigm simply disappear.
For this reason, researchers have invested significant
resources in devising, implementing, and evaluating a large
array of co-ordination techniques. As discussed in this
paper, the various approaches have their relative advantages
and disadvantages. At this time, there is no universally best
method. In general, the theoretical methods produce good
results in well-constrained environments, but many of their
underpinning assumptions are not suited to developing real-
world systems. Extant implementation-oriented work, on
the other hand, operates well in limited domains but suffers
from a lack of grounding and rigorous evaluation.
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